Endogenous Minimum Participation In International Environmental Agreements: An Experimental Analysis by McEvoy, Dave & NC DOCKS at Appalachian State University
Archived version from NCDOCKS Institutional Repository http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/ 
Endogenous Minimum Participation In International
Environmental Agreements: An Experimental Analysis
By: David M. McEvoy, Todd L. Cherry, & John K. Stranlund
Abstract
Almost all international environmental treaties require a minimum number of countries to ratify the treaty before it 
enters into force. Despite the wide-spread use of this mechanism, little is known about its effectiveness at facilitating 
cooperation. We analyze an agreement formation game that includes an endogenously determined minimum participa- 
tion constraint and then test the predictions using economic experiments. We demonstrate theoretically that players will 
vote to implement an efficient coalition size as the membership requirement and this coalition will form. Experimental 
tests of the theory demonstrate that the minimum participation mechanism is highly effective at facilitating cooperation 
when efficiency requires the participation of all players. However, when efficiency requires only a subset of players to 
participate, profitable coalitions are often deliberately blocked. In light of our results it is possible that equity concerns 
can impede the formation of international agreements when membership requirements allow free riders.
McEvoy, D. M., et al. (2015). "Endogenous Minimum Participation in International Environmental Agreements: An 
Experimental Analysis." Environmental and Resource Economics 62(4): 729-744. https://doi.org/10.1007/
s10640-014-9800-1. Publisher version of record available at: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10640-014-9800-1
1 Introduction
Almost all international environmental agreements (IEAs) require a minimum number of
countries to ratify the agreement before it enters into force. If the minimum membership
condition is met, as well as other accompanying conditions, the treaty becomes active and
ratifying countries are bound to their commitments. If the condition is not met, the treaty
never enters into force and affected countries are not bound by its provisions.Minimummem-
bership requirements are standard in treaties that address global environmental issues, and
Barrett (2003, pp. 165–194) provides a thorough examination of membership requirements
in international environmental agreements. For example, the Kyoto Protocol to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change required ratification by at least 55 parties
prior to its entry into force in February 2005. Similarly, the Montreal Protocol on Substances
that Deplete the Ozone Layer required at least 11 countries to ratify it before it entered into
force in 1989.1 Minimum membership requirements extend to treaties that address interna-
tional risk and security, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
which required the ratification of the five nuclear nations (at that time) plus 40 additional
nations. The ChemicalWeapons Convention required ratification by at least 65 nations before
it entered into force in 1997. While many treaties require ratification by a subset of affected
parties to enter into force, some require all parties to join. For example, the Convention for
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic required accession of
all contracting parties, and the Treaty of Lisbon required ratification by all European Union
member states.
Because of their wide-spread use in international agreements, there is a small game-
theoretic literature on the role of minimum membership requirements. Black et al. (1992)
find that an exogenously imposed minimummembership requirement can increase participa-
tion with an international environmental agreement. A similar finding is discussed in Carraro
and Siniscalco (1992). Clearly, however, national sovereignty requires that all provisions of
international treaties, including membership requirements, be determined endogenously by
affected parties. Carraro et al. (2009) provide an analysis of endogenous minimum partici-
pation requirements in IEAs, and find that the mechanism increases the size of cooperative
coalitions relative to the non-cooperative baseline. Particularly relevant for our study, Car-
raro et al. also find that endogenous minimum participation requirements can lead to efficient
outcomes. 2
However, empirical data on the effectiveness ofminimumparticipation constraints in IEAs
is absent because of the lack of counterfactuals and controls necessary for careful analysis.
Consequently, we use laboratory experiments to evaluate the effectiveness of endogenously
determinedminimumrequirements inmotivating coalition formation to provide public goods.
Of course, laboratory experiments, like the game-theoretic models they stem from, dramat-
ically simplify the international negotiation process. However, the experimental approach
allows us to examine the performance of particular institutions in a controlled environment.
Since international environmental agreements are designed to address collective action prob-
1 Both the Kyoto and Montreal protocols included an extra provision to ensure participants represented a
minimum level of global emissions. Members to the Kyoto Protocol had to represent at least 55% of the total
1990 greenhouse gas emissions. Similarly, the Montreal Protocol required representation of at least two-thirds
of the total 1986 consumption of ozone-depleting substances.
2 A recent working paper by Weikard et al. (2009) extends the theoretical analysis by Carraro et al. (2009) to
include heterogeneous agents under different sharing rules. Harstad (2006)models coalitions of heterogeneous
agents that contribute to a public good and derives optimal participation rules as well as solving for political
equilibria (i.e., Condorcet winners).
lems between resource users, the same fundamental tensions that exist between countries can
be simulated in a laboratory environment, and the results of experiments can shed light on
how institutional rules, in this case minimum participation rules, affect coalition formation.3
We begin by developing a theoretical model of endogenous agreement formation to pro-
vide a public good, including the endogenous determination of a minimum membership
requirement. Our model is a simplified version of the one in Carraro et al., yielding clearer
predictions so that it is amenable to tests with experimental data. The game we analyze
consists of two stages. The first stage is unique in the experimental coalition formation liter-
ature in that individuals vote on a minimum membership requirement. In the second stage,
each individual decides whether they will join a coalition to provide the public good and a
coalition forms if the membership requirement is met. We demonstrate that expected-payoff-
maximizing individuals will choose to adopt the minimum membership requirement that is
equal to the efficient coalition size, and that this coalition will form. This theoretical result
is robust to whether the efficient agreement is the grand coalition or a smaller coalition.
We designed our laboratory experiments to test these predictions. Results show that when
efficiency requires all players to join an agreement, subjects adopted the efficient minimum
membership requirement about 75% of the time. Conditional on subjects adopting the effi-
cient minimummembership requirement, efficient agreements formed over 90% of the time.
Consequently, in these cases we observe significantly higher efficiency than other coalition
formation experiments that do not include endogenous minimum membership requirements
(e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2009; Dannenberg et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2011). The results were not
as positive when efficiency required only 50% participation. While subjects still adopted the
efficient minimum membership requirement about 75% of the time, the efficient coalition
formed just over half of the time. Interestingly, the efficient coalition was blocked in about
one-third of the cases in which it was adopted as the membership condition. While this is
inconsistent with a theoretical model of individuals with standard preferences, we demon-
strate that this behavior is consistent with a theory that allows for preferences concerning
inequality in the manner of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).4 The lesson for international environ-
mental policy making is clear: endogenous minimum participation requirements are effective
at achieving high levels of cooperation, but they may be significantly less effective when the
participation requirements allow for freeriders.
Although no experimental research has investigated the effectiveness of minimum mem-
bership requirements directly, a significant literature has done so indirectly with analyses of
minimum contributing sets in public good games (e.g., Rapoport 1985; Erev and Rapoport
1990; Cadsby and Maynes 1999; Cooper and Stockman 2002; McEvoy 2010). In these
games, all individual contributions to the public good are returned if there are too few con-
tributors. In contrast with our game, minimum contributing sets are not determined by the
players themselves. A related literature on endogenous institution formation in public goods
games has received much attention recently. Most of this literature explores the formation
of institutions that govern all players (e.g., Walker et al. 2000; Gurerk et al. 2006; Tyran and
Feld 2006; Kroll et al. 2007; Sutter et al. 2010). Typically, however, international treaties are
formed to restrict the behavior of only participating nations. A handful of recent studies that
are motivated by international treaty formation examine coalition formation in public goods
3 The use of laboratory experiments in the evaluation of public policies iswell established (Plott 1987; Shogren
and Hurley 1999; Cason and Plott 1996; Stranlund et al. 2011), and experiments are particularly well suited
to evaluate the effectiveness of different voluntary institutions.
4 Others have conjectured that preferences over inequality might play important roles in international coop-
eration because all treaties must tackle issues of equity (Ringius et al. 2002; Lange and Vogt 2003).
games (e.g., Kosfeld et al. 2009; Dannenberg et al. 2010; McEvoy et al. 2011; Barrett and
Dannenberg 2012), but none consider endogenous minimum membership requirements.5
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we develop our
theoretical model and derive its predictions. In Sect. 3 we describe the experimental design
we use to test these predictions. We present the results of the experiments in Sect. 4 and
conclude in Sect. 5.
2 Theory
Consider a game in which n players decide whether to contribute a single unit to a public
good. Our model is a variant of the seminal model by Barrett (1994). Let the number of
individuals who contribute to the public good (and the total supply of the public good) be s.
Let b > 0 denote the shared benefit players receive from contributions to the public good up
to s̄ ≤ n and let c > 0 denote the individual cost of contributing. The basic payoff function
of a player that contributes to the public good is
πi = A + bs − c for s ≤ s̄, (1)
where A is a positive constant. Assume that c > b so that no player would contribute to
the public good in a standard, non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. However, suppose that
collective welfare is maximized when s̄ individuals contribute their units to the public good.
In the typical coalition formation game, collective welfare is maximized when everyone
contributes; that is, when s̄ = n. However, we also allow for the possibility that it is efficient
that the public good be provided by a coalition that is smaller than the grand coalition. We
assume a simple case of this in which individual contributions yield a return of b up to an
aggregate level and additional contributions yield a return of zero. For example, abatement
activities that move emissions levels below the absorptive capacity of the natural environment
will not yield additional environmental benefits. Examples of this also include any project
for which contributions in excess of what is required to provide the good do not yield public
benefits. In either case, if s̄ is efficient, then n(A + bs̄) − cs̄ > nA, which requires nb > c.
Given the motivation for collective action to provide the public good, suppose that the
players are able to form a cooperative coalition in a two-stage game. In the first stage (the
voting stage), all players vote on the minimum number of members required for a coalition
to form. Players cannot vote for a membership requirement equal to zero and they cannot
opt out of this vote. We call the outcome of this vote the minimum membership requirement.
In our experiments we implement a plurality voting rule so that the number that receives the
most votes becomes the membership requirement.6
5 The sequence of decisions in some of the coalition formation experiments differs significantly from the
sequence of decisions in international treaty formation. For example, in the experiments of Kosfeld et al.
(2009), players first decide whether to join a coalition, and then the members vote on whether to contribute to
the public good. Hence, in their analysis members of a coalition decide what the coalition should accomplish
after they make their participation decision. In contrast, the players in our study understand ex ante what they
are required to do in a coalition before they make their decision to join or not. This corresponds more closely
to the actual process of treaty formation, where countries typically decide the commitments of the coalition
members and what triggers entry into force before they decide whether to ratify (join).
6 A plurality voting rule is often implemented in local and national elections to determine a single winner
when there are more than two candidates. See Myerson and Weber (1993) for an analysis of voting equilibria
under plurality voting rules.
In stage two of the coalition formation game (the coalition stage), the players decide
independently and sequentially whether or not to join the coalition.7 The order in which the
players make their join/not join decisions is unknown in the voting stage of the game, and
each potential order is equally likely. This order is revealed to the players in the coalition
stage. Decisions to join or not join are observed by all other players in the second stage.8
If enough players join so that the membership requirement is met, the coalition forms and
its members provide their units of the public good. Throughout we call such a coalition an
effective coalition. Those that do not join an effective coalition do not provide their units of the
public good (because c > b), but still benefit from its provision. If the minimummembership
requirement is not met, an effective coalition does not form and no player contributes to the
public good.
We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium for this game, consisting of individual votes
for the minimummembership requirement in the first stage of the game and decisions to join
or not join a coalition in the second stage. An equilibrium is found by backward induction, so
we start by describing the coalition stage. At this point in the game a minimum membership
requirement has been chosen. Denote the membership requirement as sp . Using (1), those
who decide to join a coalition with s members earn:
πm(s) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
A + bs − c for s ≤ s̄ if s ≥ sp;
A + bs̄ − c for s > s̄ if s ≥ sp;
A if s < sp.
(2)
Throughout the superscriptm indicates the player is amember of a coalition.Nonmembers,
identified by the superscript nm, earn:
πnm(s) =
⎧
⎨
⎩
A + bs for s ≤ s̄ if s ≥ sp;
A + bs̄ for s > s̄ if s ≥ sp;
A if s < sp.
(3)
From (2) and (3) it is clear that when an effective coalition forms, nonmembers earn strictly
higher profits than members, because they enjoy the benefits of public good contributions
without incurring the cost of contributing.However, if theminimummembership requirement
is not met, both members and nonmembers earn their noncooperative payoff A.
Players will join an effective coalition only if it is profitable for them to do so in the sense
that they earn at least as much in the coalition as they would if no coalition formed. Thus, a
coalition is profitable for its members if and only ifπm(s|s ≥ sp) = A+bs−c ≥ A. Assume
throughout that a coalition with s̄ members is strictly profitable so that πm(s̄|s̄ ≥ sp) > A,
or rather, bs̄ − c > 0. Note from (2) that π (s|s ≥ sp
)
is increasing in s up to s̄ and then
is constant. Combined with b < c, these relations imply that there exist coalition sizes that
are strictly greater than one and weakly less than s̄ that are profitable. The smallest of these
profitable coalitions is:
smin = min
{
s|πm(s|s ≥ sp) = A
} = min {s|s ≥ c/b} , (4)
7 Although our game is motivated by the model of Carraro et al. (2009), it is not a special case of their model.
This is primarily due to the facts that they require unanimity in the vote for the membership requirement and
players make their decision to join an agreement simultaneously.
8 In fact, having the players decide to join or not in sequence andwith perfect information about these decisions
is a reasonable description of the actual process of treaty accessions. Differences in the lengths of national
debates about the decision to ratify a treaty and differing positions of a treaty on national legislative agendas
imply that ratification decisions must be sequential. Moreover, the decision to ratify a treaty or not tends to be
very public.
where smin ∈ (1, s̄]. For an effective coalition to form in the second stage of the game both
the membership requirement and the profitability requirement must be satisfied.
The players make their decisions to join or not join sequentially. Define a critical player
as one whose choice to not join a coalition prevents the coalition from forming. That is, a
player is critical if and only if n− sp players have already opted out of the coalition. Suppose
at first that the membership requirement is sp ≥ smin. A critical player in this situation will
always choose to join a coalition of sp members. To see why, note first that if a critical player
refuses to join a coalition then no coalition will form and the player will earn A. However, the
player earns a higher payoff if he is part of a profitable coalition. So, if a critical player joins
a coalition then he either earns this higher payoff if all the other critical players also join, or
he earns the payoff A if one of the other critical players refuses to join and a coalition does
not form. Therefore, when sp ≥ smin a critical player will always join a coalition because he
cannot be worse off by doing so and hemay be strictly better off. Since all critical players will
join a coalition, a noncritical player would never join, because it is always more profitable
to stay out of a profitable coalition. Therefore, given sp ≥ smin, the outcome of the second
stage coalition game is that an effective coalition of sp individuals will form. Moreover,
since nonmembers earn strictly higher payoffs than members, the first n − sp players in the
sequence will decide to not join the coalition and the last sp players will decide to join. In
the second stage of the game, all members of the coalition make their contributions to the
public good, while the remaining players contribute nothing.
Now suppose that the membership requirement is sp < smin. In this case, a critical player
will choose to not join because he would be joining an unprofitable coalition. Since no critical
player will join a coalition if sp < smin, the outcome of the second stage coalition game in
this case is that an effective coalition will not form and all players contribute nothing to the
public good.
To sum up, the equilibrium of the second stage coalition formation game is a coalition size
and provision of the public good s∗ such that s∗ = sp if sp ≥ smin and s∗ = 0 if sp < smin.
In the first case the first n − s∗ players to decide whether or not to join the coalition choose
not to, while the last s∗ players join the coalition.9
Now let us examine the determination of the minimum membership requirement sp in
the voting (first) stage of the game. Following Carraro et al. (2009), we assume that players
vote sincerely in the sense that they vote for the membership requirement that gives them the
highest expected payoff from the perspective of the first stage of the game.10
From our description of the coalition stage of the game, if the membership requirement is
not less than the minimum profitable coalition, a player’s payoff is determined by his position
in the order in which the players make their decisions whether to join a coalition. Recall that
this sequence is unknown in the first stage of the game. Hence, a player that expects an
effective coalition of s players to form in the second stage evaluates the probability that he
will be a member of this coalition as s/n and the probability that he will not be a member as
(n − s)/n. His expected payoff from the perspective of the first stage of the game is then:
9 Others have examined sequential decision making in threshold public good games. Erev and Rapoport
(1990) and Cooper and Stockman (2002) derive similar equilibria to ours in threshold public good games in
which players are assigned the order in which they must decide whether to contribute to a public good. In their
studies a threshold is specified exogenously, which is referred to as the minimum contributing set. We noted
the similarity between minimum contributing sets and minimum membership requirements for international
treaties in the introduction. McEvoy (2010) explores the endogenous order of sequential decisions in public
good games and finds that the timing of participation decisions is sensitive to the threshold in these games. In
particular, he finds that subjects are more likely to rush to opt out of voluntary coalitions when the free-riding
payoff is larger.
10 Palfrey (1984) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996) also analyze games given sincere voting.
v(s) = (s/n) πm(s) + ((n − s)/n) πnm(s). (5)
Remove the sp constraint from (2) and (3), substitute the results into (5), and differentiate
with respect to s to obtain:
v′(s) =
{
b − c/n > 0, for s ≤ s̄;
−c/n < 0, for s > s̄. (6)
Equation (6) indicates that the expected payoff of every player is maximized at the efficient
coalition size. Given that all players vote sincerely in the first stage of the game, each of them
votes to implement the efficient coalition as the minimum membership requirement. That is,
sp = s̄.
Moving ahead to the coalition formation stage, since the efficient coalition size is prof-
itable, sp = s̄ ≥ smin. Therefore, the coalition s∗ = s̄ will form. Obviously, if s̄ = n, then
all players will join the coalition. If s̄ < n, then the first n − s̄ players to make their join/not
join decision will choose to not join, while the last s̄ players join the coalition.11 The main
prediction of the theory is that the endogenous determination of a minimum membership
requirement allows players to form an efficient coalition to provide a public good. In the next
section we present our experimental design used to test this prediction under two scenarios;
one in which efficiency requires full participation (i.e., the grand coalition) and one in which
efficiency requires only partial participation.
3 Experiments
Following the theoretical model, our experiments have two stages, a voting stage and a
coalition formation stage. The context of the experiment is fairly generic; subjects decide
whether to join a coalition (called an agreement) with its members making a discrete choice
to contribute to the public good (called a public account). We implement two experimental
treatments that differ according to the returns to individual contributions to the public good.
In one treatment the marginal return to contributions is constant so that the efficient coalition
is the grand coalition. In the other treatment, the marginal return to public good contributions
is constant up to an aggregate level and then zero so that the efficient coalition is smaller than
the grand coalition.
We chose parameter values of n = 6, A = 10, and c = 10 for each treatment. In
one treatment the marginal return to all individual contributions was set at b = 4.5. Since
nb− c > 0 for all contributions, the efficient coalition in this case is six individuals (s̄ = 6).
In the other treatment, b = 4.5 for contributions up to three units and then zero after three
units. The efficient coalition size in this case is three individuals (s̄ = 3). Plugging our
parameter values into Eq. (4) reveals a minimum profitable coalition size of three members.
Therefore, in both treatments, coalitions of three or more are profitable for the members.
All sessions were run at the experimental economics laboratory at Appalachian State
University using software specifically designed for this experiment.12 Subjectswere recruited
from the undergraduate and graduate student populations. Two sessions were implemented
for each of the treatments. In each session, three groups of six subjects were in the lab.
11 Carraro et al. (2009) provide sufficient conditions for their game to result in the formation of the grand
coalition. Our game satisfies those sufficient conditions. Carraro et al. do not examine the case in which the
efficient coalition is smaller than the grand coalition.
12 The experiment instructions can be found at: http://davemcevoy.weebly.com/uploads/2/2/7/0/2270780/
instructions_ere2014.pdf.
These groups of six were reshuffled each period throughout the experiment, which lasted 20
periods.13 For each treatment we have 720 individual-level observations, which include their
votes for the membership requirement in the first stage and their decisions to join a coalition
in the second stage.We also have 120 group-level observations on coalition formation, public
good provision and overall group efficiency. The sessions lasted for roughly 1 h, subjects were
paid their cumulative earnings and earned $16.50 on average (20 experimental dollars = $1).
In the first stage of the experiments, subjects simultaneously voted on the minimummem-
bership requirement for a coalition to form in the second stage. The membership requirement
that received the most votes was implemented in the second stage of the game. Ties were
settled by a random draw.
In the coalition formation stage, each subject decided whether or not to join the coalition.
Following the theoretical model, these decisions were made sequentially under perfect infor-
mation. Each of the six subjects in a group was randomly assigned an order in which to make
decisions, and this order changed each period.14 For example, if a subject was assigned an
order number of three, then she had to wait for the first two players to submit their choices
before she could make her decision. Once a subject made their choice they could not change
it. During this stage, all subjects were informed about whether the subjects before them
joined the agreement or did not join the agreement. They were also constantly reminded of
the membership requirement for the agreement to form. Therefore, each player knew with
certainty whether their participation decision was critical for the coalition to form.
If enough players joined the coalition to satisfy the minimum membership requirement,
then the coalition ‘formed’ and those that joined contributed to the public good. Thosewhodid
not join did not contribute. If too few subjects joined the coalition to satisfy the membership
requirement, then no coalition formed and no one contributed to the public good.
4 Results
Our experimental data suggest the following broad conclusions. The majority of subjects in
both treatments voted for efficient minimum membership requirements. These votes led to
the adoption of the efficient membership requirements in roughly three out of every four
trials for both treatments. When efficiency required full participation (the s̄ = 6 treat-
ment), coalitions formed in 85% of all trials. The efficient coalition almost always formed
(91.3%) when the efficient membership requirement was adopted. Overall, efficiency was
very high in this treatment, about 87.4% as measured by the ratio of realized group earnings
to maximum group earnings. Hence, group results in the s̄ = 6 treatment closely matched
our theoretical predictions that groups will use the membership requirement to form effi-
cient coalitions. However, performance was significantly worse in the treatment for which
a 3-player coalition was efficient (the s̄ = 3 treatment). In this treatment coalitions formed
in only 61% of all trials and the efficient coalition formed in only about half the trials.
Consequently, average efficiency was significantly lower in these treatments (about 80%)
than in the s̄ = 6 treatments. Interestingly, the efficient coalition was blocked about a third
of the time when the efficient membership requirement was adopted. This behavior is not
13 Tomitigate reputation effects,we follow the literaturewith subject anonymity and a stranger design. Though
imperfect, the stranger design ensured no group was repeated, which was known by subjects. Anonymity
conditions did not allow subjects to track other subjects or their decisions. With similar anonymity conditions,
Fehr and Gächter (2000) find behavior is equivalent across imperfect and perfect stranger designs.
14 Subjects were not aware of their decision order when voting on the minimum membership requirement in
the first stage.
Table 1 Individual votes and referenda outcomes by minimum membership requirement and treatment
Minimum membership requirement
1 2 3 4 5 6 Totals
s̄ = 6 35 (4.9%) 27 (3.8%) 53 (7.4%) 66 (9.2%) 139 (19.3) 400 (55.6%) 720
2 (1.7%) 3 (2.5%) 6 (5.0%) 7 (5.8%) 10 (8.3%) 92 (76.7%) 120
s̄ = 3 91 (12.6%) 153 (21.2%) 409 (56.8%) 32 (4.4%) 9 (1.3%) 26 (3.6%) 720
7 (5.8%) 19 (15.8%) 92 (76.7%) 1 (0.8%) 0 (0.0%) 1 (0.8%) 120
Top of each cell Number of votes for each minimum membership requirement (percent of total votes by
treatment). Note there are 720 individual votes per treatment. Bottom of each cell Number of times each
minimum membership requirement was implemented (percent of total trials by treatment). Note there are 120
group-level observations per treatment
Fig. 1 Percentage of votes for efficient coalitions by treatment
consistent with a theory of coalition formation that includes only individuals with standard
payoff-maximizing preferences. However, we will demonstrate that this behavior is consis-
tent with a theory that allows for preferences over inequality.
We begin our detailed analysis of the results by examining the data on voting for the
membership requirement in the first stage of the experiments. Table 1 provides votes and
referenda outcomes by membership requirement and treatment. The first row in each cell
contains the number of votes and percentage of total votes (out of 720 for each treatment) for
that minimum membership requirement. The second row in each cell contains the number
of times and percentage of trails in the treatment (out of 120) that membership requirement
was implemented.
Under the s̄ = 6 treatments, the 6-playermembership requirement received 55.6% (400 of
720) of total votes, which is considerably more than the 19.3% received by the second most
preferred option of a 5-player membership requirement. The remaining four options received
even fewer votes. This voting behavior resulted in the selection of the efficient membership
requirement in 76.7% (92 of 120) of referenda.
The percentage of votes for efficient membership requirements is very similar across the
two treatments. In the s̄ = 3 treatment, the 3-playermembership requirement received 56.8%
of the votes. Membership requirements of size two received the second most with 21.2%
of votes. Mirroring the results from the s̄ = 6 treatment, voting led to the adoption of the
Table 2 Regression results comparing the two treatments
Vote on
efficient
MMR
Efficient
referenda
outcomes
Total coalition
formation
Efficient
coalition
formation
Efficiency
s̄ = 3 0.029 0.006 −0.264 −0.268 −0.069
0.817 0.922 0.000 0.003 0.015
Model 131.69 24.83 44.27 22.97 3.20
0.000 0.073 0.001 0.115 0.000
Period effects
(Chi-square)
109.54 18.57 20.56 5.89 2.58
0.000 0.182 0.2468 0.970 0.001
Subject effects
(Chi-square)
665.64 – – – –
0.000
n 1440 240 240 184 240
Notes: The first four columns report average marginal effects (and p values) for the s̄ = 3 treatment (relative
to the s̄ = 6 treatment) from Probit regressions. The first model controls for period fixed effects and subject
random effects. The other three Probit regressions are at the group-level and control for period fixed effects.
The last model is a linear regression with a dependent variable defined as total group earnings/max group
earnings and controls for period fixed effects
efficient membership requirement in 76.7% (92 of 120) of referenda. Figure 1 illustrates the
percentage of votes for efficient membership requirements over periods for both treatments.
To summarize, the majority of subjects in both treatments voted for efficient membership
requirements, and these were adopted in roughly three out of every four trials.
Figure 1 suggests that the time series of the percentages of votes for the efficient coalition
are very similar between the two treatments. We confirm this with results from a Probit
model conditioning individual voting decisions on treatment, period fixed effects and subject-
specific random effects. These results are reported in the first column of Table 2. Note that
the treatment effect (s̄ = 3) is insignificant. In addition, the Probit model in the second
column of Table 2 confirms that the likelihood of groups adopting the efficient membership
requirement is statistically equivalent in the two treatments.
Recall that our theoretical model yields the prediction that expected-payoff-maximizing
players would vote for minimummembership requirements equal to efficient coalition sizes.
Our experimental results from the voting stage are broadly consistent with this prediction in
that the majority of subjects voted to adopt the efficient membership requirements. However,
in contrast with our theoretical model we do observe significant, though minority, voting
for smaller-than-efficient membership requirements. Our theoretical model is not helpful in
explaining why 45% of votes were cast for inefficient agreement sizes. It is interesting to
note that in each treatment the second most frequent vote was for one member less than the
efficient agreement size. These votes are consistent with players attempting to increase their
chances to free ride on profitable agreements. For example, a lone free rider on a coalition
of five players in the full participation treatment would be the highest possible earner. Of
course there are other possible explanations for this behavior. If players are not confident that
other group members will join the agreement when it is rational to do so (if for example, they
have a trembling hand when making their participation decision), then a lower participation
threshold may appear less risky.15
15 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this possible explanation. See McGinty (2011) for an
example of trembling hand equilibria in a coalition formation game.
Table 3 Coalition formation by minimum membership requirement and treatment
Minimum membership requirement
1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
s̄ = 6 1 1 5 4 7 84 102
0.8% 0.8% 4.2% 3.3% 5.8% 70.0% 85.0%
50.0% 33.3% 83.3% 57.1% 70.0% 91.3%
s̄ = 3 1 9 62 0 0 1 73
0.8% 7.5% 51.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 60.8%
16.7 47.7% 67.4% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0%
Top of each cell Number of times coalitions formed. Middle of each cell Percentage coalition formation by
number of trials per treatment. Bottom of each cell Percentage coalition formation by adopted membership
requirement
While the results from the voting stage are equivalent in the two treatments, the results
from the coalition formation stage differ significantly. Table 3 contains results concerning
coalition formation by minimum membership requirement and treatment. For each member-
ship requirement/treatment combination we provide the number of times a coalition formed
under the membership requirement, this number as a percentage of total trials, and coalition
formations as a percentage of times the membership requirement was adopted. The final
column in Table 3 contains the number and percentage of trials a coalition of any size formed
(i.e., all effective coalitions).
Under the s̄ = 6 treatment, coalitions of any size formed in 102 of 120 trials (85%). In
84 of 120 trials the efficient coalition formed (70%). Moreover, when players adopted the
efficient membership requirement of six players, coalitions almost always formed (84 of 92,
91.3%). Thus, coalitions formed quite frequently in the s̄ = 6 treatments and most coalitions
were efficient. Other coalition sizes formed much less frequently. This suggests that the main
reason why coalitions did not form in a subset of trials is because groups sometimes failed to
implement the 6-player membership requirement. In both treatments, if a coalition failed to
form then no player contributed to the public good and each earned 10 experimental dollars.
In contrast, coalitions formed significantly less frequently under the s̄ = 3 treatment.
Overall, coalitions formed in 60.8% of trials in this treatment, which is significantly lower
than the 85% coalition formation rate under the s̄ = 6 treatment. This is confirmed by the
results of the third model in Table 2, which is a Probit model of total coalition formation.
Note that the dummy for the s̄ = 3 treatment is negative and significant. Furthermore, the
efficient coalition formed in 51.7% of trials (62 of 120), compared with 70% of trials in the
s̄ = 6 treatment. Themost striking difference between the two treatments is the percentage of
coalitions that formed conditional on the adoption of an efficient membership requirement.
In both treatments, the referenda resulted in efficient membership requirements in 92 of 120
trials. With the s̄ = 6 treatment, coalitions formed in 84 of those 92 trials (91.3%). However,
under the s̄ = 3 treatment, coalitions formed in 62 of those 92 trials (67.4%). The fourth
Probit model in Table 2 confirms that the likelihood of a coalition forming when the efficient
membership requirement was adopted is significantly lower in the s̄ = 3 treatment.
Let us explore this phenomenon more closely, since it implies that some individuals will-
fully blocked efficient coalitions in the sense that they were critical for the formation of
the coalition but refused to join so the coalition failed to form. The 3-player membership
requirement was implemented in 92 out of 120 trials (76.7% from Table 1) under the s̄ = 3
Table 4 Public good provision
and efficiency
Standard errors are in
parentheses. Each treatment
consists of 120 group-level
observations
Treatment Average public good provision Efficiency
s̄ = 6 4.75 87.4%
(0.26) (2.21)
s̄ = 3 1.78 79.6%
(0.31) (2.07)
treatment. The efficient coalition failed to form in 30 of these trials. These blocks are inconsis-
tent with a model that contains only individuals with standard expected-payoff-maximizing
preferences. Such individuals would never block a profitable coalition, and efficient coali-
tions are always profitable. However, these blocks are consistent with the presence of subjects
who are averse to disadvantageous inequality. When s̄ = 3, the efficient outcome requires
that the three non-members earn strictly higher payoffs than the three members. If players
dislike payoff inequality, it is possible that coalitions that are profitable in terms of material
payoffs are no longer profitable in terms of utility. In fact, minimum profitable coalition sizes
for inequality-averse players will be weakly greater than those for players with standard
preferences. Therefore, inequality-averse players may block efficient coalitions that are not
individually profitable given their inequality preferences. That inequality averse individuals
require higher minimum profitable coalition sizes is demonstrated theoretically in Kosfeld
et al. (2009) for a game that is similar to ours. We demonstrate this result for our model in
the Appendix.
We complete our data analysis with results on average public good provision and average
efficiency in Table 4. Efficiency for each group in each period is calculated as the ratio of
aggregate payoffs to maximum attainable payoffs. As expected, public good provision and
efficiency were lower in the s̄ = 3 treatment than in the s̄ = 6 treatment. The significance
of the difference in efficiency levels is confirmed in the linear regression results contained in
the final column of Table 2.
To judge the performance of the endogenous determination of minimum membership
requirements, we can compare the efficiency level of our s̄ = 6 treatment (87.4%) to recent
experimental coalition formation studies that do not include this feature. The efficiency level
in this treatment is quite high relative to these other studies.16 For example, Kosfeld et al.
(2009) conducted two coalition formation treatments which differed in the minimum number
of members required for coalitions to be profitable (either 3 or 2 out of 4). As noted earlier,
subjects in their experiments first decided whether to join a coalition, and then in a second
stage the coalition members voted whether to contribute all of their endowment to the public
good or not. Efficiency levels in their experiments were 51 and 70% for minimum profitable
coalition sizes of 3 and 2, respectively.
Among a number of treatments in McEvoy et al. (2011) were two coalition formation
treatments that differed in terms of the individual costs of providing the good, producing
different sizes of minimally profitable coalitions. These were then set as minimum member-
ship requirements. One treatment required 3 of 10 subjects to join before a coalition formed
while the other had a membership requirement of 6 of 10 subjects. The authors did not allow
contributions from nonmembers and did not allow contributions if a coalition did not form;
hence their efficiency measures are fairly conservative. Efficiency levels were 59.6% for the
3-player membership requirement and 56.2% for the 6-player membership requirement.
16 We cannot use the literature to judge the performance of our treatment, because all other coalition formation
experiments require the formation of the grand coalition for efficient provision of a public good.
Subjects performed much worse in the experiments of Dannenberg et al. (2010). They
conducted three coalition formation treatments with 10-player groups. The authors report an
efficiency level of 24% for one treatment in which coalition members’ contribution decisions
were determined automatically by maximizing joint welfare. In another treatment coalition
members only contributed half of what was required to maximize joint welfare and efficiency
fell to 12%. The efficiency level was 29% in a third treatment in which coalition members
endogenously determined the required minimum contribution. Although there are significant
differences in the protocols between the experiments in Dannenberg et al. (2010) and our
own (including group sizes), the comparison suggests that endogenous thresholds serve as
effective coordination devices in coalition formation games.
5 Conclusion
Many international environmental agreements include a minimum membership requirement
for entry into force. Despite the wide-spread use of these requirements, little is known about
their effectiveness. We have analyzed a coalition formation game that includes the endoge-
nous determination of a minimum membership requirement and then tested the theoretical
predictions of the game using a series of laboratory experiments. The main prediction of our
theoretical model is that agents will vote to adopt efficient coalition sizes as membership
requirements and that these coalitions will form. Our experimental results are largely con-
sistent with the theoretical predictions when efficiency requires the grand coalition to form.
In this treatment, coalitions formed 85% of the time and over 90% of these were the effi-
cient grand coalition. These results demonstrate the value of the endogenously determined
membership requirements. In fact, the level of efficiency for this treatment is significantly
higher than in other coalition formation experiments that do not include the endogenous
determination of membership requirements.
However, in our treatment for which the efficient coalition required only a subset of the
group, coalitions formed only 60% of the time and efficient coalitions were deliberately
blocked about a third of the time. If these blocks had not occurred, performance in this treat-
ment would have matched the performance of the treatment that required the grand coalition
to form for efficient provision of the public good. Although individuals with standard prefer-
ences would never block efficient coalitions from forming, these actions are consistent with
inequality-averse individuals. Equity concerns may help explain the choice of membership
requirements in many existing voluntary institutions; in particular, the fact that many inter-
national agreements require very high levels of participation (Barrett 2003). In light of our
results it is possible that equity concerns can limit the formation of international agreements
when membership requirements would allow free riders. One might expect that inefficiently
high membership requirements would emerge to limit freeriding, although we do not observe
this in our experiments. The role of equity preferences in the formation of voluntary agree-
ments is not well understood, so further research in this area would be beneficial. Another
caveat is that our analysis assumes homogeneity in the costs and benefits of providing a
public good. Future research should relax this simplifying assumption and explore the role
of endogenous minimum participation requirements among heterogeneous players.
Our objective was to empirically test a feature of international governance—endogenous
minimum participation—that is included in almost all environmental treaties. Although our
laboratory experiments necessarily abstract from the many intricacies involved with inter-
national management of shared resources, the results shed light on the effectiveness of the
institution in a controlled environment. The take away message for stakeholders in interna-
tional diplomacy is that endogenous minimum participation requirements can be effective
at fostering cooperation, but may be significantly less effective when targeted participation
allows for free riding.
Appendix
Here we incorporate inequality aversion into our model to demonstrate that minimum prof-
itable coalitions are weakly larger for inequality averse individuals than for individuals with
standard preferences. We follow Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in modeling preferences over
inequality. Suppose at first that s̄ = n and sp = 0. Given the financial payoffs (2) and (3)
with these restrictions, define the utility of a member of an effective coalition with s members
as:
umi (s) = πmi (s) −
αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
max
(
π j − πmi (s), 0
) − βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
max
(
πmi (s) − π j , 0
)
,(7)
where αi > 0 captures the player’s loss from disadvantageous inequality and βi > 0 captures
her loss from advantageous inequality. Since πnmj (s) − πmi (s) = c and πmj (s) − πmi (s) = 0
from (2) and (3), (7) can be written as:
umi (s) = A + bs − c −
αi c(n − s)
n − 1 . (8)
Similarly, the utility of a nonmember of an effective coalition with s members is:
unmi (s) = πnmi (s) −
αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
max
(
π j − πnmi (s), 0
)
− βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
max
(
πnmi (s) − π j , 0
)
, (9)
which can be written as
unmi (s) = A + bs −
βi sc
n − 1 . (10)
It is straightforward to show that the free-riding incentive is preserved in this model if
(n − 1)(βi − 1) < αi ; that is, as long as the aversion to advantageous inequality is not
too strong relative to the aversion to disadvantageous inequality. Incorporating the efficient
coalition size s̄ ≤ n to determine individual payoffs yields:
umi (s) =
{
A + bs − c − αi (n−s)cn−1 for s ≤ s̄;
A + bs̄ − c − αi (n−s)cn−1 for s > s̄;
(11)
unmi (s) =
{
A + bs − βi scn−1 for s ≤ s̄;
A + bs̄ − βi scn−1 for s > s̄.
(12)
Using (11), an individual’s minimum profitable coalition size can be characterized as:
s̃i
{= ŝi if ŝi ≤ s̄
> ŝi if ŝi > s̄,
where ŝi = c(n − 1) + αi cn
b(n − 1) + αi c . (13)
To demonstrate s̃i , we first derive ŝi as the solution to:
A + bs − c − αi (n − s)c
n − 1 = A. (14)
Since umi (s) in (11) is increasing in s, if ŝi ≤ s̄ then ŝi is i’s minimum profitable coalition
size. However, if ŝi > s̄, then s̃i must be the solution to
A + bs̄ − c − αi (n − s)c
n − 1 = A. (15)
Plug ŝi into (14) and s̃i into (15), set the resulting equations equal to each other and collect
terms to obtain b(ŝi − s̄) = αi c(s̃i − ŝi )/(n − 1), which implies that s̃i > ŝi if ŝi > s̄.
Recall from (4) that the minimum profitable coalition size for an individual with standard
preferences is smin = min{s|s ≥ c/b}. From (13), s̃i ≥ ŝi , ŝi is increasing in αi , and ŝi = c/b
for αi = 0. Together, these imply s̃i ≥ smin for an individual with disadvantageous inequality
aversion (i.e., αi > 0). Therefore, such an individual has a weakly higherminimum profitable
coalition size than an individual with standard preferences.
By substituting in our experimental parameters into equation (13) we can demonstrate
how large αi must be to increase the minimum profitable coalition size beyond the efficient
size. In the treatment with an efficient coalition of three members, if αi exceeds 0.584, then
the minimum profitable coalition for an individual will exceed three members. As a frame
of reference, at least 40% of players in Fehr and Schmidt’s analysis were estimated to have
α > 0.50.
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